Al-Qaradawi’s statements, concerning the “Shiite invasion” to the Sunni societies, still arouses a huge controversy. Understanding his statements necessitates putting them in a bigger picture, where we can situate the importance of this issue with regard to the Arab and Muslim world.
First, let’s take a brief look on the Sunni-Shiite split. This split is 1,400 years old, and started with a fight over who should lead the faithful after the Prophet’s death in s632. However, this fight did not transform into a fragmentation between the Muslims until the death of Ali ibn abi Taleb, the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law. After the death of Ali, one side believed that the direct descendants of the prophet should take up the role of the caliph, and they were known as the “Shiat Ali”, or the Partisans of Ali. As for the Sunnis they believed that no one is worthy of taking up the role, regardless of lineage, and this matter is resolved by “Shura” (consultation). Up until this moment we are talking about a conflict or a sectarianism that’s taking place inside the Islamic state, something more like an intellectual difference, and the Islamic state preserved its political unity despite that. This status remained till 1502 when Ismail safawi, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, started his campaign till he unified Iran by 1509. Ismail was a Shia Muslim, and after seizing power in Iran he declared Schism as the official doctrine for Iran, before that Iran was a Sunni state. The importance of this glimpse was to point out that Schism was a political movement basically, and not a religious one, that started to intertwine with the spiritual or the religious aspect later on.
At this stage there was a new conception to the post of the caliph, according to the Sunni theory, it sought to rationalize the post of the caliph, he was elected and
“Shura” was the main principle of ruling the Muslim states. The Shiite theory, on the other hand, theologized the conception of the caliph, and the post is confined to Ahl el-Bayt (the people of the house) who are the descendants of the prophet’s family and they are called Imams, note here that the Shia maintain that Ali was the first DIVINELY sanctioned Imam. Consequently, the Imam is immune to error since it is a religious position, further; the Imam is equated to the Prophet he does the same role, the only difference is that the sacred texts were revealed to the Prophet by God (Allah) other than that, they perform the same task.
The Shia’s believe in the religious authority of the Imams erupted the necessity of religiously re-interpreting the sacred texts, in order to determine who should lead the Muslims. The Shiites started to refer that the problem actually existed in the Islamic revelation itself, and that there was an exoteric and esoteric interpretations from the very beginning, and they went further by saying that only the Imam who could possibly posses these two aspects, they are basically united in him. Now, the debate has shifted, its not about who should be the successor of the Prophet, rather what’s the function of the Imam and his qualifications. Note here something, according to the Sunni vision only the Prophet is the infallible person, as for the Shiites the Imam is as infallible as the Prophet. The issue is significantly sensitive for the Sunnis because their teachings and obligations are derived directly from Sunnah (the sayings and the actions that were instituted by the Prophet), but in the Shiite envision Sunnah – and according to some Shiite schools but not all the Quran also – is incomplete, and here comes the role of the Imam who the two aspects of authority are united in him. Anyway, in the day-to-day practices Sunni and Shiites share similar understanding of basic Islamic beliefs and exhibit no difference in performing their obligatory prayers.
Basically the main issue here was re-interpreting the sacred texts; Sunnis consider the sacred texts complete and tight, and thus the attempts of revamping or re-interpreting done by the Shiites were not accepted and the Sunnis considered them heretics however, they never judged them as infidels. On the other hand, Shiites considered those who don’t believe in the Imam‘s rule are infidels, however, they throwback this judgment later on in order to create some sort of convergence with the Sunnis.
Now let’s shift to Iran. Iran is imposing itself as the Shiite sponsor, and in the same time, it’s developing its role regionally. The main force that is directing Iran is its Shiite belief, therefore, it’s logical and normal that the Arab world represents the domain of its extension; in the region lives the majority of the Shiites in the world, historically it was part of the Persian Empire, it controls massive resources that are lumped and controlling these capacities promises not only a regional role, but an international one as well, but most important of all spreading the tenets of the Islamic revolution. Iran is aware of the Political vacuum that attributes the Arab world, its political and regional influence is remarkable through supporting and backing specific groups and parties, the thing that would be more inveterate when sharing a common understating and here comes the role of Schism, anyway, it’s working on 3 fronts: firstly, Its engaging in cooperative relationship with the Gulf countries, nevertheless, tainted with a parade of strength showing who’s the dominator. Secondly, Sponsoring and supporting the line of resistance in Palestine, Syria, Lebanon. This point is conspicuously interesting, since, in my opinion, Israel isn’t the main threat facing Iran, unlike the Kurdish case; for instance, about 8% of Iranian population is Kurds, they inhabit the areas bordering Iraq and Turkey, and they represent a problem to the government especially with the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. Thirdly, Adopting an obscure strategy towards Egypt. From one side, trying neutralizing its role, basically by replacing its role as the main support for the line of resistance and inherently criticizing it, and from the other side presenting itself as paragon in the region, especially by challenging the US and Israel, while Egypt maintains its alliance with them.
Inside the region, there are two trends. Those who advocate cooperation with Iran, as it offers a crucial depth and a broader space for maneuver in dealing with the US and Israel, especially, over critical issues like Palestine, Lebanon…Fahmy Huwaidi represents one of the leaders of this trend. The other trend is composed of those who are suspicious of the Iranian intents and believe that its aspiring regional ambitions and not just simply defending the Arab causes, adherents of this trend are Arab governments mainly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and secular and leftist intellectuals.
So, how did Al-Qaradawi get into the middle of all that? Actually, he did not. The problem with Al-Qaradawi’s statements did not erupt because of him, but, because the statements were exposed to different interpretations; for those who are pro the cooperation with Iran, Al-Qaradawi’s statement were deemed disastrous for the attempts of unifying the efforts. For those who are suspecting the Iranian intentions, his statements represented an assurance to their fears. What fueled the situation even more was the interference of Islamic scholars, not only defending Al-Qaradawi, but attacking the Shiites fiercely. Nevertheless, the Iranian response to Al-Qaradawi was very harsh and offensive, remarkably, most of the responses focused on tainting the man’s reputation without real trail to refute what he said, in addition, there was no real study for this response in the Arabic media, the main concentration was on taking sides in the dispute, without really explaining what does his statements mean or what’s really referring to?
Let’s use Al-Qaradawi’s viewpoint to correctly answer that question. Al-Qaradawi is considered as a moderate Sunni scholar, however, he’s aware that his major role, not just interpretations of Quran and offering Fatwa (religious edicts), rather it is defending the sanctity of the sacred texts, and fortifying the society from any attempts of distorting its understanding of the religion.
According to Al-Qaradawi defending religion is priority, and cannot be subjected to any negotiations or bargains, thus he declares that he advocates the cooperation and alliance with Iran, yet he’s aware of the Iranian/Shiite aspirations and believes that they are not in the best interest of the society, for him, Iran is utilizing the religion for achieving political interests. Those who interpreted Al-Qaradawi’s statements feared that it could lead to a rupture with Iran, and then the Arabs would lose a substantial ally that not only share their concerns, but also, their beliefs, history and partially their culture. Al-Qaradawi, on the other hand, witnesses a severe weakness in the Arab societies, politically, economically and even socially, this situation would foreshadow a crisis for the religious convictions. For instance, Egypt is corrupted politically, in the citizens’ eye it is subject to the US foreign policy, and tightening its grip inside, the economy is in turmoil and the way its functioning is increasing the gap between the rich and the poor, as a result, the levels of corruption within the society increases in order to face the stance they are living in. On the other hand, Iran is representing itself as a successful paragon to this society, and most importantly, it’s a successful religious state, the thing that becomes attractive especially to the youth. So, Al-Qaradawi is calling for fortifying the Sunni societies, and his call was not intending to provoke or offend the Shiites, rather to act as a wake up call for the Sunnis, who, in his eyes, are impressed with the Iranian role and convinced that it represents a chance to balance their position in the region. He understands that the calls for unity cannot lead to anything except turning a blind eye towards the Iranian intentions, unity comes only between equals and he is aware that this is not the case between the Arabs and Iran, and that’s the point that most of his interpreters, and it wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say, his adherents missed to understand.
Notwithstanding, the people would support and back Al-Qaradawi, although I cannot claim that they are totally aware of the meanings, but it is the position that the religion holds in their lives, moreover, Al-Qaradawi’s credibility is unquestionable in the Sunni/Arab world. Thus his calls were met with sentimental and strong support. This issue is directly related to the Arab character, religion holds priority, it’s a stable elements and its sanctity should defended by all means and at all costs.
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Qaradawi and Zawahiri United Against the Shia
Jordanian journalist Mohamed Abu Rumman has a very interesting op-ed analyzing the latest Al-Qaeda tape in the September 21st edition of Al-Ghad newspaper. Abu Ramen always has good analysis so I have translated the key points.
Key Analysis Points (The Bolded words are added by me)
NEW EMPHASIS ON IRAN AND ITS ALLIES: The tape’s heavy focus on Iran and its allies (Hezbollah) represents a new pattern in Al-Qaeda rhetoric. In the years following 9/11, AQ took great care to avoid conflict with Iran, for many reasons, but the most prominent being a sense that there were common interests that could be built upon, such as confrontation with the US and Israel. In addition, Iran formed a critical crossing point for AQ leaders fleeing the Afghan war to different locations, although Iran did extradite several AQ figures back to their home countries and key figures, such as Sayf al-Adel and Bin Laden’s son are still imprisoned there.
Then as the Iraq war started, there was a dispute between the pragmatic rhetoric of the AQ central leadership (especially Zawahiri) and AQ in Iraq (especially Zarqawi and Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi). Initially, AQC wanted to avoid confrontation with Iran, whereas the AQ in Iraq were fighting an open war with Iran. But now the AQC position vis a vis Iran has changed dramatically and this is most evident in Zawahiri’s response to close to 90 questions posed to him a few months ago.
THE HEZBOLLAH PROBLEM: And now Zawahiri is focused on Iran, but the basis of his criticism is political and not religious or sectarian. His big issue with Iran is their inconsistent positions towards Arab and Islamic causes. On one hand, Iran basically legitimizes the US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, even calling Resistance there Harem (religously illegitimate) or terrorism. At the same time it turns around and supports the Resistance in Palestine and Lebanon. Zawahiri points to Iran’s political opportunism as one reason that it can’t be considered a reliable partner against the US. But there is another reason that explains AQ’s strategic change and this is the rise of Hezbollah since 2006, whose performance against Israel has given it widespread popularity in the media and on the Arab street- something very worrying to AQ. AQ sees the rise of sectarian tensions in the region as something the Salafi Jihadist movement can exploit to tap recruits. But this is all complicated by Hezbollah’s widespread popularity.
WHO’S WHO ON THE TAPE: Abu Ramen’s second point is related to the appearance of several leaders of AQC, especially AZ who truly is the AQ “main man.”
But the big surprise is the presence of two big name characters: Atih Allah who has gained popularity amongst the followers of AQ and plays a big role on the internet, especially as relates to the Iraqi file. The second person is Abu Yaha Al-Libie, who is most prominently in charge of issuing fatwas. As for the appearance of Abu Yazid al-Masri, Amir of AQ in Afghanistan, the big value here is to dispel rumors that he died. Noticeably absent is Abu Hamza Al-Muhajer, Abu Amr Al-Baghdadi (leader of AQ in Iraq), and Mohamed Khalil Al-Hakemiya which most prominently reflects AQ’s retreat in Iraq as compared to previous years and their inability to undertake operations in Egypt, despite their announced presence there, which confirms the significance/strength of the Revisions process which reached its climax with the announcement of Dr. Fadl’s anti-violence initiative.
OPEN SEASON IN AFGHANISTAN: On the other hand, the presence of the three key personalities of AQC on the tape, which comes after another tape which announced AQ’s responsibility for the explosion of the Danish embassy in Pakistan, reflects their free conditions in Afg/Pak, as a result of the alliance with the Taliban and the local Islamic groups. If only temporarily, for a number of reasons….
The prominent political message of the tape is that the key AQ leaders are confirming that they will stick to the fight and that they are still alive, despite the passage of 7 years of these Wars of the Cross (Crusades), this being the name AQ uses in the hope of gaining sympathy on the Arab street….Perhaps AQ has failed since 9/11 in executing the same kind of spectacular attacks and has switched to attacking soft-targets, but there is consensus amongst people who study AQ that it has become more dangerous as a “political message” accepted by groups here or there, and whose ideology might be incentive for certain Arab and Muslim youth, considering the failures/ Fowda that is ripping through most of these societies. ….AQ plays a directional role through setting the general path, whereas their followers on the ground have the responsibility of carrying out the battle.
Commentary
1) Is there any doubt that Ayman Zawahiri is the top guy in AQ? Literally, everything I read in the Arabic press suggests that he and not Bin Laden is the primary mover and shaker.
2) Solidity of the Egyptians revisions process: Ramen sees the lack of any Egyptians as a sign that they are holding. Bringing these Egyptians on the tape would probably be an embarrassment for Zawahiri as it would highlight how badly the militant groups lost in Egypt. What’s truly remarkable is how in the homeland of radical Islam, Egypt, the radical Islamist groups that existed between the 1970s and 1990s have essentially disappeared.
3) Conservative Sunnis are faced with a serious dilemma with the widespread popularity of Hezbollah. Both Zawahiri and Yusuf Qaradawi have a HEZBOLLAH PROBLEM. Attracting surprisingly little attention in the Western press, last week Yusuf Al-Qaradawi went on a long anti-Shia rant in an interview with Al-Masr Al-Youm, saying they were clearly trying to invade Sunni society with their ideas. Asked by his Egyptian interview “which is the greater danger- Shias or Wahabis?” Qaradawi said Wahabis don’t respect the opinions of anyone but themselves, then railed against the Shia:
“unfortunately there are Shia in Egypt. They tried for dozens of years unsuccessfully to recruit one Shia, from the time of Salah Ad Deen until recently….”
للأسف وجدت مؤخراً مصريين شيعة، فقد حاول الشيعة قبل ذلك عشرات السنوات أن يكسبوا مصرياً واحداً ولم ينجحوا، من عهد صلاح الدين الأيوبي حتي ٢٠ عاماً مضت ما كان يوجد شيعي واحد في مصر،
But notice his explanation for why this might be occurring:
: ( فنحن العلماء لم نحصن السنة ضد الغزو المذهبي الشيعي لأننا دائماً نعمل القول «ابعد عن الفتنة لنوحد المسلمين») He says “we the Ulema didn’t immunize (or left our society vulnerable to the penetration) because we always said avoid fitna in order to keep the Muslims united.”
Basically what he is saying here by this last quote: “we the noble Sunni clerics took the higher road and said to the rank and file, “lets stay united to avoid fitna.” As a result our people let their gaurds down, and the sneaky Shias took advantage to recruit/ spread their ideas.”
Deep down inside Qaradawi has to view the post-2006 war Hezbollah love-fest in the Arabic_press and street ( see here and here) as especially aggravating. It would not be an exaggeration that Hassan Nasrallah has Brad Pitt status amongst many Middle Eastern women. One thing I’ve noticed in Egypt recently is a trend amongst young veiled, lower or middle class women, audaciously wearing the colors of Hezbollah. For average people on the street, Hezbollah’s victory is something to take pride on- they deserve mad respect for their stand against Israel. However, for Qaradawi such displays of unity merely give those “sneaky Shias” another back-door into Sunni society to spread their ideas. Of course, he could not say that explicity- how uncool would that make him look.
Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda also have a Hezbollah problem. It largely stems from the fact that Hezbollah gets all the glory. While they get feted and treated like rock-stars for confronting Israel, Al-Qaeda is standing in the background, unable logistically to strike at Israel.
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