Al-Quds on the new Afghanistan Strategy

Most readers are  probably aware by now but President Obama has  announced the new_Afghan_strategy.  There’s not much I can say that isn’t being said by others elsewhere.  So I simply post a translation of Al-Quds Al-Arabi’s analysis of the plan.  Why is it worth reading?

First, Al-Quds is a major Middle Eastern voice and their analysis here is based on extensive interviews with the region’s experts on Afghanistan/ Pakistan and, importantly, the people that Americans never talk to– The Taliban themselves.  Second,  while  hostile to USFP,  in this article they make an effort to analyze the strategy on its merits rather than just dismiss it.  And third,  their Afghan-Pakistian expertise  is  as good if not better than what’s at the disposal of the US State Department or Military. 

Yesterday, the US President announced his new  Afghan- Pakistan strategy, based on the goal of crushing Tanzim Al-Qaeda without breaking up Pakistian.  The central element  is to send 17 k new troops as well as 4k military experts to train the Afghan forces or give them the ability to take control of the country, thus allowing the US forces to withdraw by 2011.

It’s a strategy aimed  at getting out,  not one that’s aimed at staying.   Most of the details correspond with the US plan in Iraq, but the chances for success in Afghanistan seem less because of huge differences between the two countries, at the human, geographic and regional level. 

There’s no doubt that increasing troop levels in Iraq played a big role in lowering the number of attacks on US troops and brought more security to Baghdad as compared to recent years.  But the US strategy in Iraq depended on most of the Shia accepting supporting  the occupation, and these elements possessed militias and powerful elements. 

In Afghanistan, the picture is totally different.  For one, the regime in Kabul is weak and corrupt,  and relies on groups of unpopular criminal warlords.  American newspapers have printed reports about the illegal activity of President Karzai’s brother. 

Maybe the biggest difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is the geographic factor.  Iraq is open whereas Afghanistan has rugged terrain, natural mountains, isolated regions, lacks modern roads, all factors which favor rebel groups, and give their bases natural protection.

President Obama wants to form a Pashtun version of the Iraqi Awakening forces as a way to break up the Taliban movement and divide it.  One group of moderates would be enticed into cooperating with occupation forces and joining the new security forces they are trying to build in contrast to the extremist forces who want to continue Resistance.  However, its very unlikely this will happen since the majority of the Taliban are united around Mullah Omar and want revenge against those opened the country up to foreign forces.

Of course  General Petraeus,  the founder of the Surge theory in Iraq and the idea of Awakening forces that’s central to the Afghan plan, will find some who can bought off but this group will likely be much smaller in comparison to the extreme majority.  No doubt there are minorities in Afghanistan who oppose the Taliban like the (    الطاجيك  )  in the North and the Shia in Mazar Al-Shareef.  Maybe they will be prepared to cooperate with the new US strategy like they cooperated with Hamad Karzai and his government.   However, their influence is limited to Northern regions which are essentially out of the Taliban’s control now and were even before the US invasion in 2001.

The idea of dividing the Al-Qaeda from the Taliban in order to isolate it and then defeat it, like what happened in Iraq is hugely ambitious.  Maybe it was possible in Iraq, but applying that in Afghanistan will lead to disappointing results.  In Iraq Al-Qaeda’s extremist Islamist ideology was out of place  in a country that leans towards secularism and features a wide variety of sects.  In Afghanistan, by contrast,  Tanzim Al Qaeda is in a much more welcoming environment as most Afghans are Sunnis from the Hanafi sect, which, after the Hanbalis are the closest to the Wahhabi reform movement. 

Maybe its useful to recall that AQ’s leaders, Bin Laden and Zawahiri, pledged loyalty to Mullah Omar and fight in his war, which makes it unlikely that they will distance from him.  Also,  Taliban isnt just strong in Afghanistan but in Pakistan as well.   In Pakistan, they have 4 million members including 80 thousand under arms so any attempt to break them up might be disastrous [ because it would affect Pakistan's security]  and not achieve any of the US goals.   The new US strategy is more likely to fail than succeed because its searching for moderates not amongst the Taliban but amongst the collaborators, a group which doesn’t have the ability to lead any national reconciliation or  bring the factions together. 

President Obama’s problem is that he hasn’t learned the lessons of Afghan history so that he can avoid the  mistakes of previous invaders.   The first is that entering Kabul is  always the easy part  but how to get out  with the least amount of losses is far more difficult, as the British know quite well.    The Soviets doubled their troops during their occupation which lasted ten years but the result was a disaster as increasing the number of troops led to more dead and wounded.  It can’t be ruled out the Americans will meet the same fate.

Our advice to President Obama is to cut his losses early and start negotiating with the Taliban  but not with the idea of getting them  (or even some of them) involved in the political process.  Rather to hand the  government over to them and to begin the process of immediate withdrawal.  Any other decision will lead to the same end result.  So he can either do it with the Taliban’s agreement or without it.