Hezbullah’s (Shallow) “Victory”

The prisoner exchange between Hezbullah and Israel has finally occurred.  Hezbullah hands over the remains of two dead Israeli soldiers and, in exchange, Israel releases Samir Kantar and 4 Hezbullah prisoners.  Yet, for some reason,   Arab analysts are falling over themselves to proclaim this a triumph for Hezbullah.  For example, Hussein Ayoub in Al-Ahram Weekly claims:

There is no exaggeration in calling this a victory for Hizbullah, and not only in terms of the deal. Of equal significance is the fact that it vindicates Hizbullah’s insistence that any dealings with Israel must be built on the basis of a balance of power. Only this balance can provide the solutions that politics has miserably failed to deliver.

How exactly is this is a victory for Hezbullah?  At the very least,  it was a major tactical disaster.   Hezbullah’s basic goal was to snatch a few soldiers and ransom them, knowing that, historically,  Israel has been willing to pay heavily to gets its soldiers back.  For example:

-2004:  1 Israel civilians and the bodies of 3 soldiers for 436 Arab prisoners/ bodies of 59 Leb fighters
-1996:  65 Lebanese prisoners for the bodies of two Israel soldiers
-1991: 51 Lebanese prisoners for proof that one of its soldiers held in Lebanon is dead
-1985: 1,150 Arab prisoners in return for 3 Israeli soldiers
-1983: 4,600 Pal/Leb prisoners in exchange for  6 Israeli soldiers

 Hezbullah was hoping for a prisoner exchange along these numbers.  But for this strategy to work, you have to actually have something to bargain with.  Instead, the kidnapping team totally botched the  operation by not taking the soldiers alive.  Haaretz has a good piece on some details of the operation:

  four squads of Hezbollah fighters took part in the operation. One squad was responsible for mortar fire, a second provided covering fire with small arms and larger weaponry, and a third fired in the direction of IDF emplacements in the area.  The fourth squad had the most important role, penetrating into Israeli territory with stretchers and loading the two soldiers on to a civilian vehicle which took them to a nearby location, where the vehicle was exchanged for another.

“It was clear that one of the soldiers was dead,” the report said.

As the operation began, the report says, an IDF force was operating in the area in two Hummer jeeps. Hezbollah’s aim was to take the soldiers in the first vehicle captive, without having the vehicle burn completely. The squad responsible for the kidnapping had also apparently trained for the possibility that the doors of the jeep would be locked.

The rocket-propelled grenades fired at the Hummer struck the side on which Goldwasser and Regev were sitting, wounding both. They were taken out by the Hezbollah squad, while two other IDF soldiers got out of the jeep and fled to an adjacent wooded area.

If you are going to kidnapp someone, do it right.  The whole purpose of the operation failed for the simple reason that they didn’t take any prisoners.  Dead bodies just don’t have the same value.   Let’s look at the nets and gains of the following military operation from HB’s perspective:

-Hezbullah killed about 120 IDF soldiers and about the same number of Israeli civilians.  But the IDF inflicted some very heavy blows in return. One credible estimateis that they killed 200 Hezbullah fighters, who are probably harder to replace. Net loss.
-As a result of the UN Peacekeepers, Hezbullah lost its position in South Lebanon.  Perhaps they are still there covertly, but they definitely don’t have the same freedom to move around that they did before the summer of 2006.  Net Loss.
-Hezbullah gets 5 Prisoners.  4 of them were snatched during the 2006 war.  So essentially Israeli is giving back people they kidnapped in response to Hezbullah’s failed attempt to kidnap Israelis.  Yes, Israel released Samir Kuntar, but this is more symbolic than anything, as he has been in jail for 30 years.  It is not as if he is a skilled fighter who has alot to add to future military campaigns.  He has no tactical value to Hezbullah.   At most a minor symbolic victory. 

The reality is that Israel probaly knew, almost immediately, that these two soldiers died in the initial kidnapping operation, and had little incentive to make concessions.  Pressure from the Israeli public, more than anything is what influenced the gov to make the exchange. 

Perhaps, one could argue that, despite the tactical defeats, the war was still a Strategic victory.   Haaretz’s Zvi Barrel argues that :

But the swap may be even more significant within Lebanon. Since the end of the war, Hezbollah has been trying hard to prove that even if it was mistaken in its assessment of Israel’s response to its abduction of Israeli soldiers, the war had a positive outcome.

Despite UN Resolution 1701, which theoretically set strict limitations on
military action, Hezbollah has strengthened itself militarily and politically since the war. It effectively annulled UN Resolution 1501, which laid the foundation for disarming it; it imposed its own conditions for the establishment of a new Lebanese government, attained veto power for important decisions, and is continuing its fight for an election law that would ensure it significant gains in next year’s election.

Grandmasta doesn’t agree and suspects that if Nasrallah could go back in time, he would prefer that this operation never happened.  Tactically, the party scored net losses in every form of measurement.  Politically, the Party of God may have gained PROPS from the “Arab street.”  But Cairo cab drivers are not the group Hezbullah most needs to impress.  In the process, they angered a whole lot of people inside Lebanon and globally.  Was it worth the price (from HB’s perspective)? Grandmasta doubts it.