Walking Off Into the Sunset

MediaShack readers,

The time has come for me to announce my retirement from the blogosphere.

I no longer have the motivation to consistently write good posts  on the Middle East.  Rather than let the quality slip,  I will be walking away from the blog, Michael Jordan style.

A special thanks goes out to all those who contributed to MediaShack  through writing comments.  I as well as other readers have learned an enormous amount from hearing different perspectives, many coming  from  people with experience and knowledge of the Middle East far greater than mine.

I also also want to thank all those who contributed as posters, and especially Blackstar for constant editorial guidance and not hesitating to tell me to shut the %^&* up on the few occasions when I may have written something stupid or outrageous.

It’s been fun.  Keep it real,

Rob

“Afghanistan: Lost in Translation”

I’ve long argued  that the lack of people fluent in critical languages inside US Government is a serious national security problem, although many people I talk to do not agree.  One thing I often hear is “yeah it’s bad…but we can always rely on translators.”  Well, I think this  video-clip illustrates how translators can be problematic and are hardly a reliable  alternative to having Americans with language proficiency conducting the conversations themselves.   

Look at how the Afghani translator either blatantly makes stuff up or has no clue how to translate.    This isn’t something to laugh at — fighting population centric-warfare is impossible without getting accurate readings of the populations we’re competing with the Taliban to influence.  (US strategy in Afghanistan is to try and convince the Afghanis  not to side with the Taliban but with the pro-US Karzai government.)  Just by employing translators in the first place, in any language, there is a loss of nuance, but as this video shows, these guys in Afghanistan are not professional translators — this guy is a joke.   We simply can not be competitive in fighting population centric warfare against the Taliban if we are at such a disadvantage in our  communication with the population. To use a sports term, the Taliban is “blowing us out” in this category.

UPDATE: 

 Further Observations that came to me since I first wrote this post:

-1)  It doesn’t need to be this way:    The situation could be significantly improved and it wouldn’t take a herculean effort.  There is no reason that US Army officers can’t quickly gain the level of proficiency needed to do what they need to do to fight Pop-Cen warfare in Afghanistan.  Nothing in the BBC video was all that complicated and remember, we are talking about mostly illiterate, highly unsophisticated Afghani villagers.  One doesn’t need to be able to quote literature or poetry.    Question’s like “where are the guns” or “when was the last time the Taliban was here” or “please take me to the village chief” aren’t that complicated.  Put a US Army officer through a one month crash course and he can learn enough of the language to ask the questions that need to be asked to extract the information that needs to be extracted.   Certainly this would be way more effective than relying primarily on unreliable Afghani translators and the villagers we are trying to win over would respect it so much more. 

2)  George Marshall could do it:   For those who say it’s hard to learn “difficult languages,”  George_Marshall, despite having no background or special interest in China,  learned Chinese well enough to translate in court when he was posted there between 1924 -1926.

3)  US vs France in COIN:  America may have a greater tactical need to have COIN practitioners with strong language skills due to some critical differences between the French COIN in the 1950s and the US today.  Here’s one huge advantage the French had that we don’t:  the  ability to use any means necessary.  Throwing people off of rooftops and torture  were routine parts of the French campaign and there are several books by retired French officers who openly almost brag about this ( I forget their names, but I read one a few years ago.)   Also see Battle_of_Algiers.

The US does not rely on these kinds of methods in the fighting today in Iraq and Afghanistan and to some extent this is a  tactical disadvantage.  We are not nearly as “nasty” as the French were willing to be in fighting in Algeria — so that deficit needs to be made up in other areas.  “Soft-power” is our biggest  weapon in convincing the Afghani villagers that they should choose our side and not the Taliban.  Therefore, it  seems to me that a better job on the language/ communications front, which is doable, is necessary if we are going to have any chance of beating the Taliban in Population-Centric warfare.

It’s True

From Matt Armstrong at Mountain_Runner:

To let the American public get updates to the President’s  [Ghana] speech via SMS is dangerous and, presumably, equivalent to Al Qaeda and Taleban propaganda. No wait, those messages come through just fine so it must be worse than that and even Iranian, Russian, and Chinese Government propaganda. If you’re an American, you cannot sign up for SMS updates to what surely will be an excellent speech by the President – nor could you sign up for the previous much anticipated and lauded speeches – because the Smith-Mundt Act prevents American public diplomacy activities from reaching sensitive and impressionable American eyes and ears.

It’s true.    I don’t know enough about Public Diplomacy to agree or disagree with Armstrong’s prescribed solution –  repeal_the_Smith_Mundt_Act.   I’ve heard compelling arguements both ways.  In any case, I’ve got a post coming soon on a new idea related to strategic communications.

Ikhwani vs Salafi Satellite Competition

In May, Arab Media and Society published an article on Salafi Satellite TV stations in Egypt.  One of its arguements was that the Salafi-Ikhwani relationship should not be seen as adversarial or a zero-sum game.   While Salafis and Ikhwanis may slightly differ in their tactical approach, they don’t see themselves as competitors,  but as working towards the same end goal.  Thus, the rising popularity of Salafi Satellite TV stations should not be viewed as a “bad thing” for the Brotherhood (many of whom almost certainly watch these “Salafi” stations themselves) but a good thing.  After all, when society becomes more Islamic, from the Islamist perspective, everybody wins.   

Yesterday, IslamOnline published an interesting article on the Salafi-Ikhwani relationship in Egypt, especially as relates to the spread of Satellite TV stations.  Interviewing two prominent Ikhwani activists, they generally suggest the same thing as the AMS article:  There is no zero-sum game, the rise of Salafi TV isn’t  seen as a ”loss” for the Brotherhood, they don’t see themselves as competitors…. 

أول الأسئلة التي جعلت البر يتشكك ويطالب بالكشف عن الهدف من وراء طرحها كان التساؤل الذي طرحناه حول نظرة الإخوان إلى الفضائيات السلفية التي أخذت في الانتشار مؤخرا ونجحت في استقطاب جمهور في الشارع العربي والإسلامي، وهل أثرت هذه الفضائيات سلبا على المشروع الإخواني أم أنها تتقاطع معه إيجابا؟

البر أجاب بأنه لا يرى خطورة في انتشار الفضائيات السلفية بقدر ما يراها تشكل إضافة لا بأس بها لصالح المشروع الإسلامي بشكل عام.

وقال: الإخوان لا يعتبرون أنفسهم في خصومة أو معركة مع أحد أو مع تيار يحمل راية الإسلام ويقدم فكرا إسلاميا،

……….

واستنكر البر تصوير العلاقة بين الإخوان وبين أصحاب الفكر السلفي كما لو كانت تنافسا على اجتذاب الجماهير “فهذه علاقة يمكن تصورها بين أحزاب سياسية أو بين فرق رياضية، أما العاملون للإسلام فإن اختلاف وجهات النظر في بعض المسائل الفقهية أو تناول بعض القضايا العامة لا يعني القطيعة ولا يبعث على إفساد الود”.

CIA on Iran, c. 1985

Two days ago I recommended Robert Gates’ outstanding book From_the_Shadows.  One passage in particular strikes me as especially relevant to today’s events in Iran.  In a chapter on the 1985 Iran missile scandal, Gates talks about the Intelligence the CIA had on Iran at that time: 

(398) As the arms deal went along, a central premise of supporters was that there was a “moderate” faction in Tehran or an “opposition” worth cultivating.  This was the view of the Israelis and it was the view the NSC [National Security Council]  adopted.  CIA’s Iran experts thought differently, and in the spring of 1985 and consistently thereafter they published analysis acknowledging a faction inside Iran that strictly in terms of internal affairs — especially economic policy — might be called moderate.  But there was no such faction when it came to the United States.  Towards the United States, they were all radicals.  This analysis was provided to MacFarlane and the NSC.  They chose to believe the Israelis.  The notion that there was no CIA intelligence on internal affairs is incorrect.  The intelligence we had simply was inconvenient.

Obviously as a CIA man, Gates is defending the Agency’s Intel record, but I see no reason to doubt what he says.  I’m no Iran expert, but it’s basically the same situation today:  the protesters, for the most part, especially Musawi are not left-wing and secular but Islamists playing within the system.  Their grievances with Ahmedinijad are primarily over questions of internal Iranian governance, such as economic policy, and much less about the US.

New Blog: The Boursa Exchange

It’s time to put The_Boursa_Exchange on the MediaShack blog-roll.  I first started reading several weeks ago because I wanted to monitor the author’s grammar.   I’m serious.  You see, last fall, I was at this party, minding my own business, trying to have some fun.  Lo and behold I get severely called out for making grammar mistakes on my blog.  I couldn’t believe it!  But I  give the author credit, he puts his money where his mouth is and I haven’t seen many errors.   

In all seriousness, this is a very  good site, named for one of my favorite places in Cairo, the Boursa, a series of narrow downtown side-streets with make-shift cafes.  If the New Yorker had a blog in Cairo this might be it.  Some really good posts on interesting and under-covered cultural topics.  See here and here.  Check it out.

Slayer does Cairo

In March, I  wondered_why_big_name_Rock_acts never play Cairo.  Today, I learned that  Hard-core metal band Slayer filmed the video for “Season in the Abyss” in Egypt.  I guess I’m sort of surprised but  actually not really.  Dr Zahi Hawass, pictured_here giving Obama a tour,  always recognizes an opportunity for good publicity.  And it’s not as if many Egyptians, even those who speak English, can understand their lyrics, so there probably wouldn’t be any reason to worry about a moral backlash.  I don’t even know what they are saying  and I’m a fan. 

UPDATE:   For those who might be interested in the Arab heavy metal scene, I highly recommend the book  Heavy_Metal_Islam.

Book Endorsements

Here’s some books I’ve read recently and highly recommend:

1) From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War,  Robert_Gates

I didn’t know Gates (now SecDef)  had written a book until last week while glancing through the Used Books section of my local Rainbow Records.  Might very well be the best $3 I’ve ever spent.  This isn’t just any old insider account — there have been lots of those, and from people with higher ranks at the time.  What’s unique about this book is that the author was a Russia specialist, and an analyst — the first ever to become head of the CIA.  He thinks strategically and analytically versus tactically, and explains  the issues/dilemmas  facing each of the Presidents in a very clear, non-partisan way and in a way that those who aren’t intimately familiar with Cold War or Russian history can easily follow.  Easily one of the most underrated books on US foreign policy that I’ve ever read.

2)  Undaunted Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson and the Opening of the American West, Stephen_Ambrose,

Ryan Crocker and David Petraeus have nothing on Lewis and Clark.  Alot of people think of their mission as one big camping trip, but what strikes me is the delicate diplomatic tight-wire they had to walk.    With only about 30 lightly armed soldiers, the expedition  was  surrounded on all sides by Indian tribes of overwhelming military superiority.  At any moment they could have easily killed everyone in the expedition and stolen their equipment.   Lewis and Clark constantly had to resist provocations from the tribes, knowing that any clash might put their entire mission’s goal in jeopardy — surveying the entire Western US and getting their research back to Washington.  If not for Lewis’s tremendous leadership and discipline the entire mission could have collapsed.

3) Playing for Keeps: Michael Jordan and the World He Made, David_Halbertsam

David Halbertsam was one of America’s best political journalists.  This_one (The Best and the Brightest) for example, qualifies as one of the best non-fiction books ever written.  But he was also an outstanding sportswriter, writing about basketball at the same level of depth that he wrote about national security politics.  This book on the rise of Michael Jordan is just outstanding. 

4) Fall River Dreams: A Team’s Quest for Glory, A Town’s Search for its Soul,  Bill_Reynolds

Speaking of basketball, this is another excellent book.  Alot of people don’t remember him now, but back in the 1990s, Chris Herren was supposed to be the next great white NBA superstar. I certainly was a huge fan.  He was that good and this book covers his entire junior year of high-school.

Heikal speaks on Iran

Mohamed Hussenayn Heikal, the prominent Egyptian historian/ journalist, made a special appearance 6/29 on Al-Jazeera to discuss Iran.   (For more background on Heikal see here.)   According to this article,  Heikal said that  “foreign hands” almost certainly played a major role in instigating the riots, and  also says that there is an American strategy to change the regime in Iran, pointing to decisions in Congress in recent years to delegate $200 million to destabilize the regime.  He also claims that media outlets such as Twitter were part of this campaign, saying that many were founded in the days before the elections, and many were based in Israel.  However, he thinks the Iranian regime is strong and isn’t going anywhere anytime soon.

Commentary
This is basically what I would expect Heikal, an old school pan-Arab nationalist,  to say so I’m not surprised at all.  I’m not saying his view here isn’t shared by many if not a majority of people in the region — it’s just very predictable. 

One thing I have noticed about some of Heikal’s recent statements is that he has  stated some facts that are completely incorrect.  For example, after Obama visited Cairo, Heikal gave an interview describing the speech-making process  and claimed that Henry Kissinger played a major role in writing it. That’s probably news to Kissinger.   Considering that he supported McCain, and has no special expertise or even known interest in the Islamic history and culture that formed the basis of the Cairo speech, this seems extremely doubtful.  Also, I read an article in English about the people who were consulted for the Cairo speech, and Kissinger was not even mentioned.

Interview on Al-Qaeda

Lawrence Wright, author of what is probably the best_book on Al-Qaeda, said some interesting things in an a recent   interview with Asharq Al Awsat

Q) Do you think that Al Qaeda has become a threat or an ideology?

A) I think that Al Qaeda is a threat, not just to the West but to Muslims. Many more Muslims have been killed by Al Qaeda than Americans were on 9/11, and it remains a threat. The central core of Al Qaeda is much reduced. Egyptian intelligence told me that the core of it was just 200 members and the CIA told me that they thought it was just 300-500, but there are still far fewer members at the core of Al Qaeda than there was prior to 9/11. But the idea of Al Qaeda has spread and taken root in places where it wasn’t even present before 9/11

With the greatest respect for Wright, I don’t really think it is correct to talk of “the idea” of Al-Qaeda spreading.  What exactly is this “idea?”  To describe it this way skews what Al-Qaeda means in the eyes of many in the so-called “Arab street;” it sound as if its ideology is  perceived as Nazisim or Communism.   But this is not the case.  For huge portions of the Arab populations, especially in Saudi Arabia and Egypt,  Al-Qaeda is perceived nobly, and legitimately as valiant Muslims who are heroically defending Muslim countries against American aggression.  They are not usually seen as Takfiris or deviant religious fanatics  — or if they are seen as fanatics they are seen as fanatics for a good cause.   

Check out this recent_Al-Jazeera_interview with the leader of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.  He says nothing — and I mean absolutely nothing — that falls outside of mainstream discourse in countries such as Egypt or is a violation of any teaching of Islam.  His central point is that Al-Qaeda is aiming to kick the American Army out of Afghanistan, nothing more.   Nowhere in the interview does he speak of Takfir or talk of any goal of overthrowing the “Near Enemy” or advocate any views that wouldn’t be mainstream in the Cairo neigjhborhoods of Embaba or Sayeda Zeinab.   So what’s the “idea” that we are speaking of?  What exactly is spreading if the overwhelming majority in many Arab countries strongly support Al-Qaeda’s goal of kicking the US military out of  Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf?  ( see  pages_8-10).  I should add that this is not  a question of semantics– if we misidentify  support for Al-Qaeda as support for some kind of deviant “ideology” we are fundamentally misreading the “Arab street.”

However, Wright’s assessment that there are probably 300-500 in the Al-Qaeda core does seem correct.  I’ve talked to several highly informed people recently and the consensus seems to be that AQ doesn’t number more than 300 in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  500 total throughout the world, therefore, seems like a reasonable guess.

“Stand Firm on Settlements”

Back from a trip to Israel-Palestine, Professor Lynch, aka Abu Aardvark,  gets_straight_to_the_point:  I totally agree.

Obama has to stand tough on the settlement expansions if he hopes to not squander the tentative gains of the last few weeks — and, more broadly, to see his administration’s credibility on Israeli-Palestinian issues shattered forever.  This is going to be hard to do, since the administration is badly distracted by the events in Iran and might not see this as a good time or an important enough issue to pick a costly fight with Netanyahu.  But that would be a huge mistake, because credibility lost here will be very, very hard to recover. Mitchell’s abrupt cancelation of a meetingwith Netanyahu should only be the beginning: he and Obama need to be ready to take concrete steps to force Israel to back down, or see all of the tentative progress they’ve seen made evaporate.  I think they may surprise a lot of people.

Reevaluation Time – Iran, the US, and the Arabs

Raghida Durham of Al-Hayat has an excellent analysis of the regional repercussions of the Iran crisis.  (Available in English here.)  Basically, she argues, due to the unprecedented challenge to the Iranian regime’s legitimacy, everyone in the region, especially the US, must “go back to the drawing board” and reconsider their approach to dealing with Iran.

One obvious area to watch is Iraq.  As the US Army completes its withdrawal from the major Iraqi cities this week, there are certainly reasons why Iran might find it in their interest to instigate tensions:

First, at the level of Iraq: more than any time before, this phase requires an Arab role – primarily a Saudi one – within Iraq to sow the seeds of readiness in case of imported unrest or military operations against US troops. Indeed, obstructing the withdrawal of US troops from the cities may apparently not seem like a useful goal for Tehran. Yet if the media becomes occupied with any military escalation in Iraq that might weaken and endanger the US-Iraqi security agreement, this will reduce pressures on the ruling leaders in the Islamic Republic and help turn the attention away from what they are doing at the domestic level.

Thus it is in the interest of the Arabs to be ready to support and help Iraq to continue moving forward towards stability, so that it may not become the alternative arena for power struggles within Iran. Neighboring countries especially should make certain to help Iraq through different means, so that it does not fall victim to the events in Iran. As for those countries that have clung to the notion of avoiding direct contribution in Iraq, they must reconsider, so as not to be taken by surprise by a sudden change in Iraq. …

Interview with AQ leader in Afghanistan

Al-Jazeera recently did a 45_minute_interview with the leader of  Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.   As_I’ve_said_before,  (in my view) between 90 and 99% of the strategic information that the USG wants and needs to know about enemy goals and intentions is widely available open-source.  It’s not a matter of recruiting spies  in back-alleys or breaking into safes James Bond-style, but rather opening up the newspaper, turning on the TV, or picking up the phone. Why pay for something  or steal it if you can get it for free?

New article on Iran

Flynn and Hillary Mann Leveret, together with Mohamed Merandi, a professor at Tehran University, have a new Politico_article entitled “Will Iran become Obama’s Iraq?”   This is a follow-up to  last_week’s ”Ahmedinijad won. Get Over It.”

Iran coverage at Al-Jazeera

Two interesting discussions:
1) The Tuesday episode of “The Opposite Direction” political talk-show.  Guests debate whether Iranian democracy is really democracy or just a big show?  One spoke very positively of the Iranian system and argued yes it is, the other called it a big show, and said no its not. 

2)  The 6/20 episode of “Open Dialogue,” another political talk-show.    Live from Tehran, the program interviews three Iranian intellectuals of varying political perspectives on the implications of the protests, and especially the Supreme Guide’s Friday speech.  Very good discussion.

Commentary:
Al-Jazeera is one of the few TV stations in the world that’s actually going inside Iran and seeking out Iranian analysts/ commentators to interview on the air.  Part of this is  because they are one of the few media outlets that has the ability to successfully operate inside Iran, meaning they have  people with the necessary language skills and the intimate knowledge of the country to develop networks of  contacts. Therefore,  they already have a good idea who the top intellectuals are,  so its a just a matter of calling them up on the phone and saying “hey, can we have a chat?”  Unfortunately this is not the case with many of the Western, particularly American stations.  Because of the non-existent  political relationship between the US and Iran over the last thirty years, there have been very Westerners to go and spend time in Iran, so there aren’t many US journalists who have the ability to do more than describe that protests are occurring.  What other reason explains why no Iranian political analysts  has been interviewed in the US media?  It’s always Iranian-Americans, or Iranians who have been living outside Iran for decades, but I am not aware of a single case where an Iranian close to the current events in Iran, either as a commentator or ally of any of the candidates, has  been interviewed in the US media

There are probably also political reasons which explains the US media’s absence from the Iranian arena.  I suspect that, compared to Al-Jazeera, the Iranian government perceives the Western stations as hostile or at least biased in favor of the protesters and its been harder for American journalists to get the permission.

It’s just that good……

 Kal from The Moor Next Door may have put together the  best English language piece  on Iran — anywhere in the world — over the last two weeks.  At every level, this is a gold-mine, combining deep strategic analysis of US National Security interests with an expert’s reading of the “Arab Street” and Arabic media.

On a similar note, no authoritative  understanding of Middle Eastern perceptions of events in Iran can be achieved without absorbing the ideas present in Fahmy Howedi’s Tuesday commentary at Al-Jazeera.  I know that many Americans don’t like hearing what he has to say, but if one doesn’t have to agree, they must not ignore.   This is one of the most influential voices in the Arab world, and the vast majority of people in the region not part of the ruling Status Quo classes are either going to agree or strongly sympathize with what he says.  To ignore it, is, to a large extent, ignoring the reaction of the “Arab street.”

Must-read stuff…. UPDATED

Here’s an  excellent_discussion between an Egyptian and an Iranian from the Friday episode of Al-Jazeera’s What’s Behind the News.  I would like to know if a single American media outlet went to the trouble of seeking out and interviewing, on air, a single Iranian from inside Iran about the events of the last week and a half.  I suspect the answer is no.  I should also add that to no great surprise, Al-Jazeera’s Iran coverage has been significantly better than any of the US TV stations.

UPDATE: Here’s a very interesting translated_interview from Asharq Al-Awsat (generally an anti-Iran foreign policy newspaper)  with an Iranian opposition leader.  I don’t know enough about this individual and where he stands in the Iranian political spectrum but the value of this interview is that it reflects the kind of deep nuance towards events in Iran that one isn’t getting in the US media.  He’s hitting on many of the same themes that one finds in the Arabic language Al-Jazeera clips I’ve been linking to, but not having the time to say much about.

The Security Dilemma: the US and Iran

Make no mistake about it,  the_Security_Dilemma is at play right now between the US and Iran. 

For those who are not intimately familiar with IR theory ( to be honest, that includes me), I will try and explain the term.   Basically, it refers* to the dilemma that occurs when two  hostile states try to interpret each other’s intentions and figure out how they should respond.  While state A might have peaceful intentions, this does not mean State B will interpret them this way, or vice versa.   Countless times throughout the Cold War, the US or the Soviet Union misread the other’s intentions, leading to unnecessary conflict.

Take for example the Korean War when North Korea figured that they could invade the South without provoking an American response.  There was some  reason for them to believe this.  After all, the US had done nothing when China “went Communist” in 1949 so why would they care about much less important Korea?  Not to mention that top American officials in 1950 had publicly stated that Korea was outside of the US security blanket in Asia. 

On the other hand, America also made  serious miscalculations during the Korean War.  Lots of American soldiers died because the US military assumed (or maybe it just never occurred to them)  that the Chinese wouldn’t feel threatened as Allied forces approached the Chinese border. Obviously this was incorrect and the Chinese Army launched a devastating suprise counter-attack on behalf of the Koreans. 

In any case, it is critical that the US understand how Iran today perceives American actions — and vice versa.  Here’s an important quote by   Abdel_Bari_Atwan, a major Arab journalist at Al-Quds Al-Arabi:

اسرائيل وقوى غربية عديدة لا تؤيد المظاهرات الاحتجاجية في طهران، وهي مشروعة، كشفت عن نهج حضاري سلمي منضبط، من منطلق حرصها على الديمقراطية وحقوق الانسان، وانما لرغبتها في اضعاف ايران، وتمزيق نسيجها الاجتماعي من الداخل، وضرب وحدتها الوطنية والترابية، لخوفها من مواجهتها من الخارج بالوسائل العسكرية، لما يمكن ان يترتب على ذلك من نتائج مكلفة.

“Israel and numerous Western powers do not support the demonstrations in Tehran – which are in themselves legal and have revealed a civilized, peaceful and controlled behavior – based on their aspiration to democracy; rather it is due to their desire to weaken Iran, rip its social tissue from within and hit its territorial unity due to their fear of confronting her militarily from outside the country and the resulting costly consequences.”

The majority of pundits and bloggers in America (perhaps subconsciously) have sided with the Protesters, though some stick out more than others (see  here and here.)  I have no doubt that they see themselves as acting within the Wilsonian tradition of Democracy promotion, something they see as critical to the advancement of US National Security Interests.  I have yet to hear anyone in the American media openly state that they support the protests in order to destabilize Iran, as Atwan suggests. 

But if many Americans view themselves as altruistic Wilsonians, fighting nobly for the cause of Democracy in Iran, this is certainly not the dominant view from “the other side.”    The majority in the Arab world would agree with Atwan, not to mention those inside Iran who voted for Ahmedinijad (probably a majority), and certainly his supporters inside the Security Apparatus.  From their viewpoint, the US position can only be interpreted in one way: an attempt to destabilize Iran.   How else to interpret the State Department’s special_request  to Twitter to delay repairs in order to facilitate the protesters?  Or President Obama’s  calls_for_”justice” and comparisons between the Iranian protesters   and Martin Luther King? ( keep in mind  those who voted for Ahmedinijad see him as having won fair and square, so after a certain point, continued protests are no longer protests.)  Certainly they wouldn’t see these kinds of statements as neutral. 

A bear is most dangerous when  threatened and this is what could potentially be happening right now.   There is no doubt that the Iranian regime, especially the Security Apparatus, shares Abdel Bari Atwan’s view — that the US supports the protests in order to destabilize Iran.  Why is that important?  If events in Iran were happening in a vacuum, it would not be.  But  noone should assume that what happens in Iran, stays in Iran, and won’t affect Iranian foreign policy calculations in Iraq, Lebanon, and even Afghanistan.  Raghida_Durham_of_Al-Hayat is probably correct on this point:

Obama should expect of Ahmadinejad more stringency and strictness towards the United States after what happened, no matter how much the US President tries to cling to caution, in order to avoid and defend against the accusation of interfering in Iran’s affairs. He should expectthe mullahs of Tehran, led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to take preemptive or vengeful measures, not necessarily in Iraq or Afghanistan, but rather in Palestine and Lebanon. He should be careful, aware and wakeful of Iran and Israel implicating the United States in order to undermine Barack Obama’s insistence on making peace in the Palestinian issue. He should anticipate preemptive policies, so as not to find himself chasing the events, as did his predecessor Jimmy Carter in Iran 30 years ago.

One Obama advisor on Iran says_this:

“We clearly have to be on the right side of history here,” says Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment and an informal adviser to the White House. But he cautions that “if we try to insert ourselves into the momentous internal Iranian drama that’s unfolding, we may unwittingly undermine those whom we’re trying to strengthen.”

Noone would disagree with the above underlined statement.  Seriously,  who would actually want to be on the wrong side of history?  But what’s the right side in this situation?  Is it the protesters who may or may not have a valid claim that the overall results were fixed?  Or is it the side that officially won — and may have actually and decisively won?  It would seem to me that extreme prudence is critical.  And although many Americans probably see their country’s actions so far as prudent and neutral, this is definitely not how they are being seen by many on “the other side.”

UPDATE:  I hadn’t even noticed this, but two days ago the US Congress passed resolutions formally endorsing the Protesters which probably explains the President’s ratcheting up of rhetoric today.    Read Kal at the Moor Next Door’s savage_critique of the bill.

* A smart reader informs me that I may have my IR terms wrong (I got alot of Cs in IR classes).  Perhaps instead of “Security Dilemma” I am actually talking about “miscommunication.”  The point of the post stays the same but here’s his comment: 

  “Then maybe you should take out the ’security dilemma’ part of it.  I always understood security dilemmas as arms races where you build up your side because you don’t feel secure enough, and that is seen as threatening by the other side.  i think you are talking about just straight up miscommunication.”

“Khamenei throws down the gauntlet”

See Will Ward’s post at Iran in the Gulf.  A line seems to have been drawn in the sand.    Up through Saturday, protests were peaceful and tolerated but now the Supreme Leader is saying “Enough is Enough.”    According_to Abdel Bari Atwan it’s not  Musawi but Karbowi who is most adamant about pushing for demonstrations:

 هناك مدرستان واضحتا المعالم في اوساط المحتجين، الاولى يتزعمها السيد مهدي كروبي رئيس مجلس الشورى الاسبق، وتطالب بالاستمرار في المظاهرات حتى الغاء نتائج الانتخابات الاخيرة، والمدرسة الثانية وتدعو الى تنظيم مظاهرات جديدة وهي الاكثر عقلانية، ويتزعمها السيد مير حسين موسوي رئيس الوزراء الاسبق الذي خدم في هذا المنصب ثماني سنوات عندما كان السيد خامنئي رئيسا للدولة.

Here are some important questions that the media hasn’t really answered:

1) Who exactly are the protesters?  Where are they from?  Are they primarily from N. Tehran?

2)  To what extent are the protestors  actually affiliaed with Musawi?  And to what extent are they actually organized and coordinated?  After all, despite all the hype, there’s no hard evidence that Twitter has been a major factor in facilitating them.    Put it this way:  if Twitter didn’t exist what would have happened differently over the past eight days?  I suspect not very much. 

3)  Does Musawi control them?  More importantly, does Musawi have the ability to stop them?  This we will find out….

A good piece

  Here’s another good  analysis from Al-Hayat.

UPDATE:  Here’s the same article translated_into_English.  For some context:  the author is a major  Arab voice, though much  more favorable to American foreign policy than most in the region.    I don’t believe she has special expertise on Iran but certainly is in the kind of position where she can pick up a phone and get access to people who seriously are.  In any case, I would say her view here is  definitely more anti-Iranian regime than many other Arab intellectuals.    Putting this Iran piece in context — this is the same writer who was   more_optimisitic  than most about Obama’s Cairo speech.