Why we don’t understand Iran

America’s problems developing top-notch intelligence on Middle Eastern countries have been well documented.  But here’s an excellent  article from Reuters on the huge expertise gap on Iran.  This point in particulur I think is important:

That was followed by a five-year Strategic Human Capital Plan that pinpointed part of what is one of the biggest problems: “non-U.S. citizens who cannot meet our security requirements.”

DIFFICULT SECURITY CLEARANCE

That phrase leaves out the huge pool of American citizens who are native speakersof Farsi, Arabic and other languages deemed critical for gaining a better understanding of  opaque countries like Iran or penetrating al Qaeda and its affiliates.

The vetting process for a security clearance is almost as high a barrier for them as for non-citizens. For decades, dual citizenship and having close non-citizen family members were grounds for automatic disqualification from jobs that required a security clearance.

That changed last October with a new directive that allows exceptions to be granted on a case-by-case basis when there is a “compelling need that is based upon specific national security
considerations.”

That requirement  is hard to meet for first-generation Americans who have close relatives living in Middle Eastern countries. The government fears they could be subject to blackmail or family pressure.

Added to this, there is “an underlying mistrust of Muslim Americans or Arab Americans in the national security area,” according to Frederick P. Hitz, a former inspector general of the CIA.

This is a major issue.   The fact is, those with foreign relatives, especially in the Middle East, and most countries hostile to the US such as Iran, are going to have an extremely difficult time getting a security clearance.  And for those unfamiliar with the system, if you can’t get a security clearance, you can not work. 

Does it really have to be this way?  There are basically two main jobs in the intelligence community: those who collect information and those who analyze information.  I can understand why the question of loyalty might be an insurmountable security risk in the the first group.  But does this mean people sitting in desks in the US, analyzing foreign politics, really should have to pass the same level of scrutiny?   Take for example, open-source intelligence, where people monitor foreign media.  Should someone whose job is to read Iranian media have to pass the same security measures as someone who recruits spies?   Most of these Middle Eastern-Americans don’t want to be spies but intelligence analysts in the US.  For the most part, they have much more difficult passing the security clearance, and that may be having a detrimental effect on America’s understanding of Iran:

Iran’s government saw the hand of the CIA behind the street protests and violence that followed Ahmedinejad’s June 12 elections. Perhaps it was. But a deep study of the Iran by one of America’s most respected think tanks makes one wonder.

Commissioned by the U.S. Air Force and released by the RAND Corporation a few weeks before the elections, the 230-page study said America’s understanding of Iran’s complex political landscape was so limited that attempts to foment internal unrest were likely to be unsuccessful.

In general, the US intelligence community operates under  the principle, “the more secret the better.”    Maybe this is necessary, especially in certain tactical areas,  but it also makes it harder to develop top notch strategic intelligence  on the critical countries as the RAND study demonstrates.

Very Interesting

From the New_York_Times:

WASHINGTON — In a series of interrogations before his execution, Saddam Hussein told an F.B.I. agent that, on the eve of the 2003 American invasion, Iraq was trapped between United Nations orders to demonstrate that it had disarmed and a fear that appearing too weak would invite attack from its powerful neighbor and foe, Iran.

The ousted Iraqi dictator “was more concerned about Iran discovering Iraq’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities than the repercussions of the United States for his refusal to allow U.N. inspectors back into Iraq,” according to an F.B.I. summary. The inspectors, he feared, “would have directly identified to the Iranians where to inflict maximum damage to Iraq,” he told the F.B.I.

The summaries of 20 formal interviews and five additional “casual conversations,” as his captors called them, all from 2004, were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive

Taking the Offensive in Afghanistan

The US has just launched a major COIN offensive into Taliban-controlled territoty:

CAMP LEATHERNECK, Afghanistan, July 2 — Thousands of U.S. Marines descended upon the volatile Helmand River valley in helicopters and armored convoys early Thursday morning, mounting an operation that represents the first large-scale test of the U.S. military’s new counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

The operation will involve about 4,000 troops from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, which was dispatched to Afghanistan earlier this year by President Obama to combat a growing Taliban insurgency in Helmand and other southern provinces. The Marines, along with an Army brigade that is scheduled to arrive later this summer, plan to push into pockets of the country where NATO forces have not had a presence. In many of those areas, the Taliban have evicted local police and government officials, and taken power.

…………

The U.S. strategy here is predicated on the belief that a majority of people in Helmand do not favor the Taliban, which enforces a strict brand of Islam that includes an eye-for-an-eye justice and strict limits on personal behavior. Instead, U.S. officials believe, residents would rather have the Afghan government in control, but they have been cowed into supporting the Taliban because there was nobody to protect them.

On Iraq Withdrawal

So the US has_withdrawn_from_the_major_Iraqi_cities.  Readers may remember (or not) that in previous posts I wondered whether withdrawing too quickly would be a mistake.  As in, what would happen if the day after  all hell broke lose?  Wouldn’t it be alot harder to go back in and restore security once we had withdrawn?  However, I’ve been talking to people who follow Iraq closely, and now I am convinced that the US is taking the best approach.  Here’s an excellent_briefing by Michael Hanna at World Politics Review:

But the logical case for withdrawal remains unchanged, starting with the binding obligation to withdraw on a fixed timetable as part of the SOFA negotiated by the Bush administration. More broadly, our expanding commitments in Afghanistan and the impact of the current economic downturn have added urgency to the need to rebalance the U.S. military posture.

Delaying withdrawals because of recent bombings would have given insurgents veto power over U.S. actions. More perilously, it would have conceded a key strategic goal of the ongoing insurgency by undercutting the legitimacy of the Iraqi government as sovereign over Iraqi territory. It would also have undermined U.S. credibility in the region at a time when the Obama administration is seeking buy-in and support for its ambitious regional agenda from partners in the Arab world.

Iraq’s security gains remain fragile and reversible. But although withdrawal entails risks, there is no credible alternative.

Also, see Marc Lynch’s post at ForeignPolicy.com

“Egypt-US: Just Like the Old Days”

The Arabist has the  first_in_a_series_of_posts analyzing the US-Egypt relationship under President Obama.

Barack Obama’s Cairo speech — whatever you might say of his fine rhetoric on Islam and Palestine — was also, and over time might also be chiefly, a reassertion of the traditional relationship between Egypt and the United States, dropping most pretense of being interested in democracy promotion. Instead, in the democracy segment of his speech, he mostly focused on those things that are popular with Americans, such as religious (rather than civic and political) freedoms, and appeared to warn against Islamist parties being elected when he warned that democracy is not just about elections (a fine claim if he had added that it’s also about civic rights, rather than mentioning it in the context of Islamism – “there are some who advocate for democracy only when they are out of power; once in power, they are ruthless in suppressing the rights of others”)…..

Over the next few days I’ll take a look at some of the other outcomes of the speech and some recent changes in the Egypt-US relationship.

I look forward to reading the additional posts on this topic….

Only in America…

No, this story has nothing to do with the Middle East.  But it is hilarious.  Only in America can David Beckham 1) not be recognized and 2) be refused alchohol at a bar because he forgot his I.D.

Meanwhile, Beckham made an effort to fit in, and on his first MLS road trip he endured an only-in-America experience. After his first training session with the Galaxy, in Washington two days before a nationally televised game against D.C. United, he helped organize a dinner with 10 other players at Morton’s steak house in Arlington, Va. Beckham had enjoyed the players-only meals at Real Madrid, and if he was going to be just one of the lads in the Galaxy locker room, things needed to get off on the right foot. Not long after they took their table, the waiter asked if anyone wanted wine. They all raised their hands.

“O.K.,” the waiter said. “I need to see some I.D.’s.”

“I don’t have my I.D. with me,” Beckham said.

“No I.D., no wine!” the waiter announced, theatrically snatching Beckham’s wineglass.

Beckham thought it was a put-on. “Is this guy taking the piss?” he asked. But the waiter was serious. When the Galaxy’s Portuguese defender Abel Xavier couldn’t produce an I.D., his wineglass disappeared too. “What is this?” the 34-year-old Xavier thundered. “I have a kid who can drink.” The other players laughed hysterically, partly because the waiter hadn’t recognized the world’s most famous athlete and partly because Beckham and Xavier were so used to being mobbed in Europe that they didn’t bother carrying identification. Welcome to soccer in the U.S., guys.

Heikal speaks on Iran

Mohamed Hussenayn Heikal, the prominent Egyptian historian/ journalist, made a special appearance 6/29 on Al-Jazeera to discuss Iran.   (For more background on Heikal see here.)   According to this article,  Heikal said that  “foreign hands” almost certainly played a major role in instigating the riots, and  also says that there is an American strategy to change the regime in Iran, pointing to decisions in Congress in recent years to delegate $200 million to destabilize the regime.  He also claims that media outlets such as Twitter were part of this campaign, saying that many were founded in the days before the elections, and many were based in Israel.  However, he thinks the Iranian regime is strong and isn’t going anywhere anytime soon.

Commentary
This is basically what I would expect Heikal, an old school pan-Arab nationalist,  to say so I’m not surprised at all.  I’m not saying his view here isn’t shared by many if not a majority of people in the region — it’s just very predictable. 

One thing I have noticed about some of Heikal’s recent statements is that he has  stated some facts that are completely incorrect.  For example, after Obama visited Cairo, Heikal gave an interview describing the speech-making process  and claimed that Henry Kissinger played a major role in writing it. That’s probably news to Kissinger.   Considering that he supported McCain, and has no special expertise or even known interest in the Islamic history and culture that formed the basis of the Cairo speech, this seems extremely doubtful.  Also, I read an article in English about the people who were consulted for the Cairo speech, and Kissinger was not even mentioned.

Sounding just like Dick Cheney

Is Juan Cole advocating regime change in Iran?  A  guest_columnist at his blog certainly seems to be:

It would be a mistake to think that people like Ahmadinejad are reasonable. It is counter productive to base policy on the untenable premise that he would be amenable to a cost-benefit analysis on the nuclear issue. Time and again he has announced that the nuclear issue is off the table. To believe or hope otherwise would be a profound and resonant error.

The option that is left for the United States is either to effectively support Mousavi’s camp today or risk a military confrontation with Ahmadinejad tomorrow.

Interview on Al-Qaeda

Lawrence Wright, author of what is probably the best_book on Al-Qaeda, said some interesting things in an a recent   interview with Asharq Al Awsat

Q) Do you think that Al Qaeda has become a threat or an ideology?

A) I think that Al Qaeda is a threat, not just to the West but to Muslims. Many more Muslims have been killed by Al Qaeda than Americans were on 9/11, and it remains a threat. The central core of Al Qaeda is much reduced. Egyptian intelligence told me that the core of it was just 200 members and the CIA told me that they thought it was just 300-500, but there are still far fewer members at the core of Al Qaeda than there was prior to 9/11. But the idea of Al Qaeda has spread and taken root in places where it wasn’t even present before 9/11

With the greatest respect for Wright, I don’t really think it is correct to talk of “the idea” of Al-Qaeda spreading.  What exactly is this “idea?”  To describe it this way skews what Al-Qaeda means in the eyes of many in the so-called “Arab street;” it sound as if its ideology is  perceived as Nazisim or Communism.   But this is not the case.  For huge portions of the Arab populations, especially in Saudi Arabia and Egypt,  Al-Qaeda is perceived nobly, and legitimately as valiant Muslims who are heroically defending Muslim countries against American aggression.  They are not usually seen as Takfiris or deviant religious fanatics  — or if they are seen as fanatics they are seen as fanatics for a good cause.   

Check out this recent_Al-Jazeera_interview with the leader of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.  He says nothing — and I mean absolutely nothing — that falls outside of mainstream discourse in countries such as Egypt or is a violation of any teaching of Islam.  His central point is that Al-Qaeda is aiming to kick the American Army out of Afghanistan, nothing more.   Nowhere in the interview does he speak of Takfir or talk of any goal of overthrowing the “Near Enemy” or advocate any views that wouldn’t be mainstream in the Cairo neigjhborhoods of Embaba or Sayeda Zeinab.   So what’s the “idea” that we are speaking of?  What exactly is spreading if the overwhelming majority in many Arab countries strongly support Al-Qaeda’s goal of kicking the US military out of  Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf?  ( see  pages_8-10).  I should add that this is not  a question of semantics– if we misidentify  support for Al-Qaeda as support for some kind of deviant “ideology” we are fundamentally misreading the “Arab street.”

However, Wright’s assessment that there are probably 300-500 in the Al-Qaeda core does seem correct.  I’ve talked to several highly informed people recently and the consensus seems to be that AQ doesn’t number more than 300 in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  500 total throughout the world, therefore, seems like a reasonable guess.

“Stand Firm on Settlements”

Back from a trip to Israel-Palestine, Professor Lynch, aka Abu Aardvark,  gets_straight_to_the_point:  I totally agree.

Obama has to stand tough on the settlement expansions if he hopes to not squander the tentative gains of the last few weeks — and, more broadly, to see his administration’s credibility on Israeli-Palestinian issues shattered forever.  This is going to be hard to do, since the administration is badly distracted by the events in Iran and might not see this as a good time or an important enough issue to pick a costly fight with Netanyahu.  But that would be a huge mistake, because credibility lost here will be very, very hard to recover. Mitchell’s abrupt cancelation of a meetingwith Netanyahu should only be the beginning: he and Obama need to be ready to take concrete steps to force Israel to back down, or see all of the tentative progress they’ve seen made evaporate.  I think they may surprise a lot of people.

Reevaluation Time – Iran, the US, and the Arabs

Raghida Durham of Al-Hayat has an excellent analysis of the regional repercussions of the Iran crisis.  (Available in English here.)  Basically, she argues, due to the unprecedented challenge to the Iranian regime’s legitimacy, everyone in the region, especially the US, must “go back to the drawing board” and reconsider their approach to dealing with Iran.

One obvious area to watch is Iraq.  As the US Army completes its withdrawal from the major Iraqi cities this week, there are certainly reasons why Iran might find it in their interest to instigate tensions:

First, at the level of Iraq: more than any time before, this phase requires an Arab role – primarily a Saudi one – within Iraq to sow the seeds of readiness in case of imported unrest or military operations against US troops. Indeed, obstructing the withdrawal of US troops from the cities may apparently not seem like a useful goal for Tehran. Yet if the media becomes occupied with any military escalation in Iraq that might weaken and endanger the US-Iraqi security agreement, this will reduce pressures on the ruling leaders in the Islamic Republic and help turn the attention away from what they are doing at the domestic level.

Thus it is in the interest of the Arabs to be ready to support and help Iraq to continue moving forward towards stability, so that it may not become the alternative arena for power struggles within Iran. Neighboring countries especially should make certain to help Iraq through different means, so that it does not fall victim to the events in Iran. As for those countries that have clung to the notion of avoiding direct contribution in Iraq, they must reconsider, so as not to be taken by surprise by a sudden change in Iraq. …

Interview with AQ leader in Afghanistan

Al-Jazeera recently did a 45_minute_interview with the leader of  Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.   As_I’ve_said_before,  (in my view) between 90 and 99% of the strategic information that the USG wants and needs to know about enemy goals and intentions is widely available open-source.  It’s not a matter of recruiting spies  in back-alleys or breaking into safes James Bond-style, but rather opening up the newspaper, turning on the TV, or picking up the phone. Why pay for something  or steal it if you can get it for free?

The King is Dead

Even Al-Jazeera is in_on_the_coverage.  I first realized Michael Jackson’s global status a couple years ago while teaching an English class to a group of African refugees in Egypt.  For a homework assignment, I told each student to write a paragraph on a person they admire.  Most of the responses were predictable:  several said the Prophet Muhamed, a Christian said Jesus, many expressed admiration for Nelson Mandela.  I nearly fell off my chair laughing ( in a positive way), when I got to Osman, the lone Somali in the class:  ” I admire Michael Jackson.  That man can dance.”

New article on Iran

Flynn and Hillary Mann Leveret, together with Mohamed Merandi, a professor at Tehran University, have a new Politico_article entitled “Will Iran become Obama’s Iraq?”   This is a follow-up to  last_week’s ”Ahmedinijad won. Get Over It.”

Cleaning house in South Africa

Spotlight has been on Iran, but the US soccer team has been kicking $%& lately:

1) America_3,_Egypt_o

2) America_2,_Spain_0

I’m always amused when I meet non-Americans who like to remind me  how supposedly bad America is at soccer.  I’ve got a couple British friends who take special pride in highlighting how superior the talent level is in the UK compared to the US.   Yeah, its basically true, but nor is it a deep mystery why.  It has nothing to do with athletic ability — we almost always win the most medals at the Olympics– rather it’s a question of priorities.  In America, kids grow up playing football, baseball and basketball, with soccer being a distinct fourth place.  There is no glory or money in playing soccer in the US, whereas in Europe and elsewhere, the exact opposite is true.  Thus,  Europe’s best athletes play soccer, in the US they play football, baseball, and bball.  Does anyone really think that if Allen Iverson, Tom Brady, Larry Fitzgerald etc, grew up dedicating their energy to becoming soccer stars, that we wouldn’t be as good as Brazil, France or Italy?  Maybe even better since the US  has 300 million people to draw from, they have 60-80 million or so.

Iran coverage at Al-Jazeera

Two interesting discussions:
1) The Tuesday episode of “The Opposite Direction” political talk-show.  Guests debate whether Iranian democracy is really democracy or just a big show?  One spoke very positively of the Iranian system and argued yes it is, the other called it a big show, and said no its not. 

2)  The 6/20 episode of “Open Dialogue,” another political talk-show.    Live from Tehran, the program interviews three Iranian intellectuals of varying political perspectives on the implications of the protests, and especially the Supreme Guide’s Friday speech.  Very good discussion.

Commentary:
Al-Jazeera is one of the few TV stations in the world that’s actually going inside Iran and seeking out Iranian analysts/ commentators to interview on the air.  Part of this is  because they are one of the few media outlets that has the ability to successfully operate inside Iran, meaning they have  people with the necessary language skills and the intimate knowledge of the country to develop networks of  contacts. Therefore,  they already have a good idea who the top intellectuals are,  so its a just a matter of calling them up on the phone and saying “hey, can we have a chat?”  Unfortunately this is not the case with many of the Western, particularly American stations.  Because of the non-existent  political relationship between the US and Iran over the last thirty years, there have been very Westerners to go and spend time in Iran, so there aren’t many US journalists who have the ability to do more than describe that protests are occurring.  What other reason explains why no Iranian political analysts  has been interviewed in the US media?  It’s always Iranian-Americans, or Iranians who have been living outside Iran for decades, but I am not aware of a single case where an Iranian close to the current events in Iran, either as a commentator or ally of any of the candidates, has  been interviewed in the US media

There are probably also political reasons which explains the US media’s absence from the Iranian arena.  I suspect that, compared to Al-Jazeera, the Iranian government perceives the Western stations as hostile or at least biased in favor of the protesters and its been harder for American journalists to get the permission.

It’s just that good……

 Kal from The Moor Next Door may have put together the  best English language piece  on Iran — anywhere in the world — over the last two weeks.  At every level, this is a gold-mine, combining deep strategic analysis of US National Security interests with an expert’s reading of the “Arab Street” and Arabic media.

On a similar note, no authoritative  understanding of Middle Eastern perceptions of events in Iran can be achieved without absorbing the ideas present in Fahmy Howedi’s Tuesday commentary at Al-Jazeera.  I know that many Americans don’t like hearing what he has to say, but if one doesn’t have to agree, they must not ignore.   This is one of the most influential voices in the Arab world, and the vast majority of people in the region not part of the ruling Status Quo classes are either going to agree or strongly sympathize with what he says.  To ignore it, is, to a large extent, ignoring the reaction of the “Arab street.”

What to expect from Iran

A grizzly bear is  most dangerous when it feels threatened and insecure; Iran is that and more right now.  The situation is extremely volatile and its repercussions could threaten US interests in other parts of the region.  Eventually Iran is going to stabilize and the Iranians will respond.  How will they?  Here are some possible scenarios:

1) Humbled, conciliatory and more receptive to the US.  
Obviously, this is what many Americans want but I suspect this is unlikely to happen.

2)  Insecure, Threatened, and Vengeful. 
Regardless of whether the vote was legitimate or not, the street  protests are an unprecedented challenge to the government’s legitimacy, and since Friday the Supreme Leader himself.   Don’t think they are going to just sit down and let their authority be undermined.   The Revolutionary Guards, for example,  see Ahmedinijad as the legitimate victor,  the protesters as  sore losers or worse, and the  Americans as having intervened on behalf of the Protesters in a hostile attempt to destabilize Iran.  So there is certainly potential for retaliation and Iran is capable of  threatening US  regional interests:

a) Iraq.  The US is in the process of withdrawing from Iraqi cities, something that Iran certainly has the ability to complicate — to say the very least.
b) Lebanon.  Can probably agitate sectarian strife through the allies in Lebanon.
c) Afghanistan.  Can make things much more difficult than they already are. 
d) Shia minorities in the Gulf.  Always a potential thorn in the side of the Gulf States.
e) Israel-Palestine.  Certain factions in Israel would be more than happy to go along with any Iranian effort to sabotage the peace process. 

3) Something in between. 
I’d say something in between #2 and #3 is the most likely response at this point.

UPDATE:  Not surprisingly, Iran has just ordered three_days of military maunevers in the Gulf.

Must-read stuff…. UPDATED

Here’s an  excellent_discussion between an Egyptian and an Iranian from the Friday episode of Al-Jazeera’s What’s Behind the News.  I would like to know if a single American media outlet went to the trouble of seeking out and interviewing, on air, a single Iranian from inside Iran about the events of the last week and a half.  I suspect the answer is no.  I should also add that to no great surprise, Al-Jazeera’s Iran coverage has been significantly better than any of the US TV stations.

UPDATE: Here’s a very interesting translated_interview from Asharq Al-Awsat (generally an anti-Iran foreign policy newspaper)  with an Iranian opposition leader.  I don’t know enough about this individual and where he stands in the Iranian political spectrum but the value of this interview is that it reflects the kind of deep nuance towards events in Iran that one isn’t getting in the US media.  He’s hitting on many of the same themes that one finds in the Arabic language Al-Jazeera clips I’ve been linking to, but not having the time to say much about.

The Security Dilemma: the US and Iran

Make no mistake about it,  the_Security_Dilemma is at play right now between the US and Iran. 

For those who are not intimately familiar with IR theory ( to be honest, that includes me), I will try and explain the term.   Basically, it refers* to the dilemma that occurs when two  hostile states try to interpret each other’s intentions and figure out how they should respond.  While state A might have peaceful intentions, this does not mean State B will interpret them this way, or vice versa.   Countless times throughout the Cold War, the US or the Soviet Union misread the other’s intentions, leading to unnecessary conflict.

Take for example the Korean War when North Korea figured that they could invade the South without provoking an American response.  There was some  reason for them to believe this.  After all, the US had done nothing when China “went Communist” in 1949 so why would they care about much less important Korea?  Not to mention that top American officials in 1950 had publicly stated that Korea was outside of the US security blanket in Asia. 

On the other hand, America also made  serious miscalculations during the Korean War.  Lots of American soldiers died because the US military assumed (or maybe it just never occurred to them)  that the Chinese wouldn’t feel threatened as Allied forces approached the Chinese border. Obviously this was incorrect and the Chinese Army launched a devastating suprise counter-attack on behalf of the Koreans. 

In any case, it is critical that the US understand how Iran today perceives American actions — and vice versa.  Here’s an important quote by   Abdel_Bari_Atwan, a major Arab journalist at Al-Quds Al-Arabi:

اسرائيل وقوى غربية عديدة لا تؤيد المظاهرات الاحتجاجية في طهران، وهي مشروعة، كشفت عن نهج حضاري سلمي منضبط، من منطلق حرصها على الديمقراطية وحقوق الانسان، وانما لرغبتها في اضعاف ايران، وتمزيق نسيجها الاجتماعي من الداخل، وضرب وحدتها الوطنية والترابية، لخوفها من مواجهتها من الخارج بالوسائل العسكرية، لما يمكن ان يترتب على ذلك من نتائج مكلفة.

“Israel and numerous Western powers do not support the demonstrations in Tehran – which are in themselves legal and have revealed a civilized, peaceful and controlled behavior – based on their aspiration to democracy; rather it is due to their desire to weaken Iran, rip its social tissue from within and hit its territorial unity due to their fear of confronting her militarily from outside the country and the resulting costly consequences.”

The majority of pundits and bloggers in America (perhaps subconsciously) have sided with the Protesters, though some stick out more than others (see  here and here.)  I have no doubt that they see themselves as acting within the Wilsonian tradition of Democracy promotion, something they see as critical to the advancement of US National Security Interests.  I have yet to hear anyone in the American media openly state that they support the protests in order to destabilize Iran, as Atwan suggests. 

But if many Americans view themselves as altruistic Wilsonians, fighting nobly for the cause of Democracy in Iran, this is certainly not the dominant view from “the other side.”    The majority in the Arab world would agree with Atwan, not to mention those inside Iran who voted for Ahmedinijad (probably a majority), and certainly his supporters inside the Security Apparatus.  From their viewpoint, the US position can only be interpreted in one way: an attempt to destabilize Iran.   How else to interpret the State Department’s special_request  to Twitter to delay repairs in order to facilitate the protesters?  Or President Obama’s  calls_for_”justice” and comparisons between the Iranian protesters   and Martin Luther King? ( keep in mind  those who voted for Ahmedinijad see him as having won fair and square, so after a certain point, continued protests are no longer protests.)  Certainly they wouldn’t see these kinds of statements as neutral. 

A bear is most dangerous when  threatened and this is what could potentially be happening right now.   There is no doubt that the Iranian regime, especially the Security Apparatus, shares Abdel Bari Atwan’s view — that the US supports the protests in order to destabilize Iran.  Why is that important?  If events in Iran were happening in a vacuum, it would not be.  But  noone should assume that what happens in Iran, stays in Iran, and won’t affect Iranian foreign policy calculations in Iraq, Lebanon, and even Afghanistan.  Raghida_Durham_of_Al-Hayat is probably correct on this point:

Obama should expect of Ahmadinejad more stringency and strictness towards the United States after what happened, no matter how much the US President tries to cling to caution, in order to avoid and defend against the accusation of interfering in Iran’s affairs. He should expectthe mullahs of Tehran, led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to take preemptive or vengeful measures, not necessarily in Iraq or Afghanistan, but rather in Palestine and Lebanon. He should be careful, aware and wakeful of Iran and Israel implicating the United States in order to undermine Barack Obama’s insistence on making peace in the Palestinian issue. He should anticipate preemptive policies, so as not to find himself chasing the events, as did his predecessor Jimmy Carter in Iran 30 years ago.

One Obama advisor on Iran says_this:

“We clearly have to be on the right side of history here,” says Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment and an informal adviser to the White House. But he cautions that “if we try to insert ourselves into the momentous internal Iranian drama that’s unfolding, we may unwittingly undermine those whom we’re trying to strengthen.”

Noone would disagree with the above underlined statement.  Seriously,  who would actually want to be on the wrong side of history?  But what’s the right side in this situation?  Is it the protesters who may or may not have a valid claim that the overall results were fixed?  Or is it the side that officially won — and may have actually and decisively won?  It would seem to me that extreme prudence is critical.  And although many Americans probably see their country’s actions so far as prudent and neutral, this is definitely not how they are being seen by many on “the other side.”

UPDATE:  I hadn’t even noticed this, but two days ago the US Congress passed resolutions formally endorsing the Protesters which probably explains the President’s ratcheting up of rhetoric today.    Read Kal at the Moor Next Door’s savage_critique of the bill.

* A smart reader informs me that I may have my IR terms wrong (I got alot of Cs in IR classes).  Perhaps instead of “Security Dilemma” I am actually talking about “miscommunication.”  The point of the post stays the same but here’s his comment: 

  “Then maybe you should take out the ’security dilemma’ part of it.  I always understood security dilemmas as arms races where you build up your side because you don’t feel secure enough, and that is seen as threatening by the other side.  i think you are talking about just straight up miscommunication.”